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INTO THE WASTELAND: APPLYING EQUALITY
PRINCIPLES TO MEDICAL INADMISSIBILITY
IN CANADIAN IMMIGRATION LAW
ROSE VOYVODIC*
RItSUM
Le principe bien ancr6 qui ressort des lois et de la jurisprudence et fait que des
privileges et non des droits sont accord6s aux 6trangers concourt, avec les 616ments
sociaux, biom6dicaux et 6conomiques rattach6s aux handicaps, a former un mur quasi
insurmontable pour les personnes handicap6es qui tentent de s'installer au Canada.
L'auteur 6tudie l'opportunit6 d'une analyse pouss6e en mati re d'6quit6 afin que le
terrain hostile qu'est le droit de l'immigration au Canada devienne accessible aux
personnes handicap6es et conclut que les injustices du droit doivent faire 1' objet d'un
examen beaucoup plus minutieux par toutes les couches de la soci6t6 pour qu'un
changement soit possible.
INTRODUCTION
Recent Canadian jurisprudence appears to signal a growing respect for the differences
of disability and a retreat from the use of difference as a means to justify exclusion.
The implications of such an approach for immigration law, and specifically its
"medical inadmissibility" criteria, however, are uncertain, due both to the absence of
political ,will to adapt the legislation to a more flexible, inclusive standard, and the
profound deference with which decision making in relation to immigration is treated
by the courts.
In this paper, I will examine the issue of disability as a bar to immigration from a
substantive-equality perspective. It is my contention that, just as the norms underlying
certain rules that unfairly exclude persons with disabilities from other areas of society
have been held to be discriminatory, so should be discriminatory immigration rules,
which may unfairly exclude persons with disabilities from Canadian society itself.
The fact that this has not occurred to date suggests that governmental and judicial
reliance upon principles of state sovereignty, which invest foreign non-residents and
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1. I will use the terms foreign non-residents and aliens interchangeably in this discussion to describe
persons who lack the protected status accorded to citizens.
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permanent residents with "rights" as opposed to "privileges," must also be overcome
in order to give equality and human rights law its intended scope.
I will begin by discussing substantive equality, as informed by disability-rights theory,
and consider the particular challenges inherent in bringing such an analysis to
immigration law, which is inherently exclusionary. I will then attempt to apply this
theory to the "medical inadmissibility" criteria, in order to demonstrate that they are
discriminatory. I will conclude by proposing a rights-based law-reform strategy to
eradicate discrimination against persons with disabilities who seek entry and admis-
sion to Canada.
I. THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION
Since the middle of the twentieth century, Canadian law has slowly begun to afford
mechanisms with which to confront discrimination. The introduction of human-rights
legislation and the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms have
responded to a growing social and legal consciousness of the linkage between the
inequality stemming from "difference" and the harm of injustice and unfairness.
Human-rights awareness grew in Canada with the unanimous adoption by the inter-
national community of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 -a statement of
basic rights and fundamental freedoms to which all people are entitled-in 1948.
Subsequently, Canada became a signatory to additional legally binding international
human-rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights3 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.4
Canada's resulting international human-rights obligations inspired and shaped the
human-rights protections provided domestically, including the Canadian Bill of
Rights, as an expression of the egalitarian values embodied in these international
instruments. 5
Domestic human-rights legislation enacted provincially and federally also reflected
these principles and provided a framework from which to analyze the social, political
2. Adopted 10 December 1948, GA Res. 2174 I0, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71. Article 25 states,
"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, the
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control."
3. Adopted 16 December 1966, in force for Canada 19 August 1976, GA Res. 220(XXI), UN GAOR,
Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); article 26 provides for equality before the law and equal
protection and that the law shall "guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination," based on enumerated grounds, which are "race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." The concept of
status is considered to be inclusive of disability.
4. Adopted 16 December 1966, in force for Canada 19 August 1976, GA Res. 220(XXI), 21 UN
GAOR, Supp. No.16,49, UN Doc.A/6316 (1966).
5. See Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step
Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989)
at 28-30.
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and economic inequities experienced by persons with disabilities as individuals. The
preamble to the Ontario Human Rights Code, for example, harkens back to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in stating, "recognition of the inherent dignity
and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."6
Cases decided under Canada's domestic anti-discrimination statutes reflect a growing
commitment to these egalitarian values, particularly in relation to the meaning of
discrimination and the variety of remedies that might be appropriate. Tribunals and
courts now display a sophisticated understanding of discrimination, which need not
be intentional, and may be group based and systemic, and may call for remedies that
"reach to and reverse conditions of inequality."'7
The proclamation of the Charter and its constitutional guarantee of equality further
expanded the potential for rights-based litigation strategies predicated upon a substantive
theory of equality and continued the trend to enact human-rights protections into law.
According to section 15 of the Charter,
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.8
However, progress toward the goal of equality articulated by section 15 has been
distressingly slow for seekers of equality, as evidence of the transformative potential
of equality-rights law continues to appear only "at the margins" of judicial decisions,
with some notable exceptions. 9
Among the first cases heard by the Supreme Court of Canada after the equality rights
provisions of the Charter came into effect was Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia.10 Significantly, in that case, it was noted that "the accommodation of
differences.., is the essence of true equality."'I Discrimination was described as
6. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19.
7. Supra note 5 at 35.
8. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to
the Canada-Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
9. See for example, M. David Lepofsky, "A Report Card on the Charter's Guarantee of Equality to
Persons with Disabilities after 10 Years: What Progress? What Prospects?" (1996-97) 7 National J.
Constitutional Litigation at 263, also M. Young, "Change at the Margins: Eldridge v. British Colum-
bia (A.G.) and Vriend v. Alberta" (1998) 10 Cdn. J.Women & Law at 244, and BCGSEU v. B.C.
[19991 S.C.J. 219, to be discussed infra.
10. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. In this case, a non-citizen lawyer seeking admission to the British Columbia bar
complained that the burden of having to wait three years until eligible to obtain citizenship, which
was imposed by the legislated requirement of citizenship, was unfair and discriminatory, under
section 15 of the Charter.
11. Ibid. at 169.
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a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal
characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens,
obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others,
or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits and advantages avail-
able to other members of society. 12
The Court held that
[t]he promotion of equality entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure
in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving
of concern, respect and consideration ...
The effect of the impugned distinction or classification on the complainant must be
considered. Once it is accepted that not all distinctions and differentiations created
by law are discriminatory, then a role must be assigned to s. 15(1) which goes
behind the mere recognition of a legal distinction. A complainant under s. 15(1)
must show not only that he or she is not receiving equal treatment before and under
the law or that the law has a differential impact on him or her in the protection or
benefit accorded by law but, in addition, must show that the legislative impact of
the law is discriminatory.
McIntyre, J. also found that facially neutral laws may be discriminatory:
It must be recognized at once ... that every difference in treatment between indi-
viduals under the law will not necessarily result in inequality and, as well, that
identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality. 13
This case has been hailed as a "more comprehensive and dynamic vision of equality
than that offered by formal equality doctrine" found in cases decided under the
Canadian Bill of Rights.14 Similarity of treatment does not promote the full inclusion
of all individuals in society, and often has the effect of creating barriers when "likes
are treated alike," as noted in the passage quoted from Aridrews, above, and as the
recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in BCGSEU v. BC 15 amply demonstrates.
In BCGSEU, the Court explicitly accepted criticisms of formal equality on the grounds
that it enables systemic discrimination: the Court-held that exclusionary rules must
take the existence of entrenched norms-which militate against equality-into account
in purporting to treat all applicants "equally," so that reasonable accommodation of
12. Ibid. at 44.
13. Ibid. at 164.
14. Sandra A. Goundry and Yvonne Peters, Litigating for Disability Equality Rights: The Promises and
the Pitfalls (Winnipeg: The Canadian Disability Rights Council, 1994) at 19. Formal equality doc-
trine, which posits that equality means equality in the form of the law and requires treating everyone
the same, rather than changing the conditions of those who are disadvantaged, is criticized for being
incapable of recognizing that different treatment may be warranted where the same treatment will
produce unequal effects for members of disadvantaged groups.
15. Supra note 9. This case considered whether a minimum physical-fitness standard imposed on candi-
dates for Initial Attack forest firefighter positions discriminated against a woman who failed an
aerobic capacity test that, while neutral on its face, was met differently by women and men.
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differences may be provided. 16 Through its recognition of the profound, systemic
effects of exclusionary rules, this caselaw signals a dramatic shift towards emerging
standards of inclusivity of differences and an unequivocal rejection of formal equality
theory.
Substantive-equality theory, which requires same treatment in some instances and
differential treatment in others, takes a contextual, "effects-based approach," thereby
addressing the failure of formal equality doctrine to comprehend that the form a
distinction takes is irrelevant, since discrimination can often be identified only by
looking to the effects of a law, policy or practice.
An effects-based approach is evident in other section 15 cases, such as Eldridge v.
British Columbia (A.G.), 17 in which the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly recog-
nized the "unfortunate truth that the history of disabled persons in Canada is largely
one of exclusion and marginalization."Is In that case, the failure of the British
Columbia Medical Services Commission and provincial hospitals to provide sign-lan-
guage interpreters for deaf patients, where necessary for effective communication,
was found to be discriminatory under section 15. After noting that the objective of
Canadian health-care policy is to "protect, promote and restore the physical and mental
well-being of residents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services
without financial or other barriers," the Court determined that deaf patients were
prevented from benefiting equally from the provision of medical services in compar-
ison to hearing patients, a distinction that is illegal. The Court found that the distinction
is based on a personal characteristic that is irrelevant to the functional values under-
lying the health care system. Those values consist of the promotion of health and
the prevention and treatment of illness and disease, and the realization of those
values through the vehicle of a publicly funded health care system. There could be
no personal characteristic less relevant to these values than an individual's physical
disability.
This approach to constitutional equality claims is also contextual, in that it allows
facially neutral rules to be placed in a context that exposes the discriminatory norms
underlying the rules, as well as their effects. 19 These norms may be invisible to
16. This decision adopts a central criticism of the formal theory of equality: its failure to "challenge the
imbalance of power... [or] go to the heart of the equality question, to the goal of transformation, to
an examination of the way institutions and relations must be challenged in order to make them
available, accessible, meaningful and rewarding for the many diverse groups of which our society is
composed," at para. 41.
17. (1997) 151 D.L.R. (4th) 577.
18. Ibid. at para. 56.
19. In Vriend v. Alberta (A.G.), Mr. Justice Cory stated, "If equality rights for minorities had been
recognized, the all too frequent tragedies of history might have been avoided." It was held in that
case that the omission of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination under the
Individual's Rights Protection Act was discriminatory because "the effect of the decision to deny
homosexuals recognition under the legislation is to reinforce negative stereotyping and prejudice
thereby perpetuating and implicitly condoning its occurrence": (1998), 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at 417.
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everyone except the individual or group that does not fit them; for example, in a
disability context, norms found in public policies and social practices that treat persons
with disabilities exactly the same as their able-bodied counterparts "usually result in
the exclusion of the person with a disability. '20
A contextual approach is made possible through the judicial consideration of the
historical, social, economic and political dimensions of discrimination. For example,
in the Eldridge case, LaForest, J. created a context within which to analyze the
complaint of disability-based discrimination by setting out a number of "facts" related
to disability. These "facts" are explicitly derived from disability-rights theory advanced
by advocates and critics such as M. David Lepofsky, Sandra A. Goundry, and Yvonne
Peters. Included in this theory is a perspective upon the genesis of the harm of
disability-based discrimination, chiefly outdated societal norms through which dis-
ability continues to be understood generally in modem Canadian society.21
Because the appellants in the Eldridge case were deaf, LaForest, J. then examined the
specific nature of the disadvantages faced by that population and concluded that they
derived "from barriers to communication with the hearing population. '22
In this new jurisprudence, the "context" in which enumerated groups find themselves,
including the existence of societal norms that operate as barriers to participation, is
explored before the rule that is alleged to be discriminatory in the particular case is
tested. Therefore, in order to strategize a contextual approach to immigration rules
that may discriminate against persons with disabilities, it is necessary to identify the
context in which legal problems arise, such as the existence of any societal norms that
may result in disadvantageous effects, before turning to the specific elements of the
medical inadmissibility rules. In addition to norms that are common to disability-based
discrimination, it is also necessary to look at any discriminatory norms that may be
identified in relation to immigration law and policy.
20. Goundry and Peters, supra note 14 at 23.
21. These models, which are discussed more fully in the next section of this paper, are encapsulated in
this judgement by LaForest, J.: "Persons with disabilities have too often been excluded from the
labour force, denied access to opportunities for social interaction and advancement, subjected to
invidious stereotyping and relegated to institutions... This historical disadvantage has to a great
extent been shaped and perpetuated by the notion that disability is an abnormality or flaw. As a
result, disabled persons have not generally been afforded the 'equal concern, respect and
consideration' that s. 15(1) of the Charter demands. Instead, they have been subjected to paternalis-
tic attitudes of pity and charity, and their entrance into the social mainstream has been conditional
upon their emulation of able-bodied norms ... One consequence of these attitudes is the persistent
social and economic disadvantage faced by the disabled," described by statistical information to be
that "persons with disabilities, in comparison to non-disabled persons, have less education, are more
likely to be outside the labour force, face much higher unemployment rates, and are concentrated at
the lower end of the pay scale while employed," at para. 56.
22. Ibid. para. 57.
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A. Disability-rights theory
Modem disability-rights theory offers a richly contextualized approach to discrimina-
tion through the exploration of the norms arising from several notorious "models of
disablement" in Canadian society.
In the latter part of the twentieth century, the disability-rights movement began to
focus attention upon stereotypes and prejudice against persons with disabilities.
Challenges were launched against exclusionary rules and practices that operate as
barriers to accessibility of services and therefore limit full participation in many areas
of society, from education to employment.
Much work has been done to shift the focus away from "impairment" to the social
environment in which persons with disabilities function. In this way, exclusionary
rules may be tested for evidence of discrimination through the application of disabil-
ity-rights theory that takes a contextual look at their substantive effect.
This theory has been developed through deconstructing disability itself to account for
the historical exclusion and marginalization of persons with disabilities. Several
models of thought that have operated to inform discriminatory law, policies, and
practices have been identified: the "socio-political" model, the "biomedical model"
and the "economic model" of disability.
I will briefly review these models, and then consider their implications for immigration
law as a foundation for my claim that persons with disabilities face institutionalized
inequality in the law relating to entry and admission of aliens to Canada.
1. The socio-political model of disability as a social construct
The model that disability-rights activists consider to hold the most promise for full
participation by persons with disabilities encompasses the "social-political" 23 aspects
of disability. Discrimination is viewed as the result of society's constructing environ-
ments in which people with disabilities are disadvantaged, or "handicapped.1 24 For
example, people who use wheelchairs would not be restricted in their mobility if the
social environment within which they move were accessible; in other words, if barriers
to mobility did not exist, individuals who use wheelchairs would not be considered
23. Ian B. McKenna, "Legal Rights for Persons with Disabilities in Canada: Can the Impasse be
Resolved?" (1997-98) 29 Ottawa L. Rev. 153 at 163. Other writers have used the term social model
of disability: seeLiz Crow, "Including All of Our Lives: Renewing the Social Model of Disability,"
in Jenny Morris, ed., Encounters with Strangers: Feminism and Disability (London: The Women's
Press Ltd., 1996).
24. The origins of the term handicap (cap-in-hand) are said to derive from old English laws that required
people with disabilities "to engage in the vocation of begging for charity to relieve them from their
poverty": Ian B. McKenna, ibid., note 178, citing C.H. Cohen and D.A. Ravensdale, Discovering
Abilities (Yellowknife: Yukon Public Service Commission, Employment Equity Branch, 1990) at 2.
Unfortunately, this term continues to be used in human-rights legislation. David Lepofsky notes that
the term disability is better than handicap, since it "neutrally characterizes a physical or mental
condition without prejudging its impact upon the individual's capacity to effectively function in
society," and the "preferred, current usage of 'persons with disabilities' has major advantages" over
terms such as handicapped persons, disabledpersons, and the disabled, supra note 9 at 278.
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"disabled" for purposes of mobility. 25 This viewpoint shifts the focus from the
limitations present in the person to the social environment itself that creates the
limitations. 26
Such a viewpoint locates the problems facing persons with disabilities in the barriers
that they confront, rather than in the persons themselves, and has given rise to the legal
concept and duty to accommodate as a means of redressing discriminatory rules and
practices.
2. Focus on impairment: the biomedical perspective
The biomedical model of disablement focuses attention on "impairment" and "locates
the problem firmly in the person who is, in some way, defective, different and
incapable, in relation to medically defined norms upon which the biomedical model
of disablement is built."'27
Jerome Bickenbach views this model as predominant in traditional Canadian social
policy, and therefore problematic for attempts to encourage the "reasonable accom-
modation" approach. He notes that it is impossible to recognize the abilities of persons
identified as having disabilities, in order to design more accommodating environ-
ments, when people with disabilities are seen as having
a defect, deficiency, dysfunction, abnormality, failing or medical "problem" that is
located in an individual. We think it is so obvious as to be beyond serious dispute
that disablement is a characteristic of a defective person; someone who is function-
ally limited or anatomically abnormal, diseased, or pathoanatomical; someone who
is neither whole nor healthy, fit nor flourishing, someone who is biologically infe-
rior or subnormal.28
Bickenbach notes that this model leads to a predisposition to seek solutions in medical
treatment, rather than in changing the social environment, and "tends to suggest a
charity or needs-based normative basis for disablement theory. ' 29 He also observes
25. This example is taken from Peters and Goundry, supra note 14 at 3.
26. liz Crow writes, "The social model ... shifts the focus from impairment onto disability, using this
term to refer to disabling social, environmental and attitudinal barriers rather than lack of ability,"
supra note 23 at 208. See also M. David Lepofsky and Jerome E. Bickenbach, "Equality Rights and
the Physically Handicapped" in Bayefsky and Eberts, eds., Equality Rights and the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985).
27. McKenna, supra note 23 at 162.
28. Jerome Bickenbach, Physical Disability and Social Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1993) at 61. Liz Crow writes that "the medical model makes the removal of disadvantage contingent
upon the removal or 'overcoming' of impairment-full participation in society is only to be found
through cure or fortitude," supra note 23 at 208.
29. Bickenbach, ibid. at 96. Ian B. McKenna observes that an example of this model in the reasoning of
Sopinka, J. in Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, (1997) 142 D.L.R.
(4th) 385, which avoided any consideration of equality rights under the Charter, and focused instead
upon the assessment of the "needs" of a child with cerebral palsy in deciding that these needs could
not be met in a regular classroom, requiring her segregation in a "special" class.
Applying Equality Principles to Medical Inadmissibility in Canadian Immigration Law 123
that this perspective underpins the "economic" model of disability, which shares the
emphasis of the biomedical model upon the condition of the individual. 30
3. "Ablebodism" vs. "disability': An economic perspective on the dichotomy
Michael Oliver traces the way in which an individual's social worth came to be
measured in relation to his or her attachment to the labour force to the historical period
surrounding the Industrial Revolution, which saw the rise of industrial capitalism and
the development of liberal individualism. 31
Oliver identifies the cause of the systemic exclusion of people with disabilities from
the mainstream world of work as the society's shift away from community production
to individual wage labour, which made "non-productive" members become part of an
underclass of society that is marginalized, isolated, and devalued. 32
In this century, programs that focus on disability and work, such as workers' compen-
sation, social security, and vocational rehabilitation, have become "pillars of contem-
porary Canadian disablement policy" within the economic model.33 These programs
focus on the physical or mental condition of the individual "worker" when assessing
the economic efficiency of assisting those with disabilities to make necessary adjust-
ments to allow their participation in the labour force.
In many cases, when an economic assessment is actually conducted, the cost of such
accommodation is minimal. 34 Nevertheless, many employers have sought to resist
what they perceive as a threat to their traditional privileges by alleging that accom-
modating "different" workers (including those with disabilities) would represent
"undue hardship. ' 35
30. Bickenbach, ibi& at 90.
31. Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement. A Sociological Approach (New York: Saint Martin's
Press, 1990). Prior to this time, Oliver notes that work was principally agrarian, and did not exclude
the majority of people with disabilities from participation in some aspect of production, notwith-
standing a societal regard for them as "unfortunate" (at 27-28).
32. Goundry and Peters observe that Oliver identifies a societal response to the "burden" of disability as
the removal of individuals with disabilities from the community and into institutions of all kinds,
including workhouses, asylums, hospitals, prisons, and special schools. They later comment that "the
forces of discrimination and paternalism continue to operate effectively to preserve this second-class
status. It is discriminatory attitudes and paternalism which are largely responsible for the warehous-
ing of people with disabilities into institutions, sheltered workshops and segregated 'special' educa-
tional facilities," supra note 14 at 5.
33. McKenna, supra note 23 at 162.
34. Laurie Robertson, executive director of the Toronto-based group Transportation Action Now, sug-
gests that "many employers are terrified that accommodation will cost them a fortune, when, in fact,
on average it costs less than $500." "The Daily Chore of Disability" The Globe and Mail (29
February 2000) C9.
35. The "duty to accommodate" has traditionally been viewed as a defence to a prima facie case of
discrimination (i.e., that discrimination had to occur because the person's needs could not be accom-
modated without undue hardship). The BCGSEU case suggests that the concept of accommodation is
more akin to a right or entitlement, as opposed to a burden for employers and others from whom
equality-seekers seek services.
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Bickenbach contends that disablement policy in general must resolve its "impasse"
by a synthesis of the traditional biomedical and economic models and the new
socio-political model of disablement, which underlies the duty of accommodation
embodied in federal and provincial human-rights legislation. 36
4. Models of disablement in an immigration context
It will be argued in the next section of this paper that both the biomedical model and
the economic model of disablement have been solidly integrated into the "medical
inadmissibility" criteria in immigration law, to the detriment of potential immigrants
and visitors with disabilities. These criteria may be seen to reflect a widely accepted
and long-standing belief that persons with disabilities cannot be valuable contributors
to Canadian society and, indeed, are more likely to pose a threat to either public health
through exposure to contagious disease carried by immigrants, or to health and welfare
systems, through excessive demands made by such immigrants for treatment and care.
It is suggested that the introduction of a new way of looking at immigration admissi-
bility, which is sensitive to disability, would resist the application of discriminatory
norms and allow for a more accurate assessment of the interests, needs, and abilities
of persons with disabilities, in order to suggest possible methods to accommodate
differences. A synthesis of the "socio-political model" within a flexible, non-discrim-
inatory system of admission would reflect principles emerging in other areas of law,
for example, in Supreme Court of Canada judgements in Eldridge and BCGSEU.37
Before developing the argument that the immigration rules are discriminatory, I will
first examine a major source of difficulty that must be considered in strategizing
equality litigation in immigration law. This relates to the legal status, or more
accurately, the lack thereof, accorded to aliens, which in turn determines the types of
protections and remedies afforded by Canadian law.
B. Rights or privileges: The alien and equality theory
In this section of the paper, I will attempt to assess the possibilities for the application
of equality and human-rights law to immigration rules treating the admission and entry
to Canada of persons with disabilities. Several observations seem relevant at the outset
of this task: First, there is relatively little caselaw in which claims based in either
equality or human rights have been brought in an immigration context,38 and almost
36. Supra note 28. McKenna, supra note 23, takes Bickenbach's notion of the "impasse" and examines
pre-BCGSEU jurisprudence and attendant social policy to assess whether this impasse may be
resolved. Like Bickenbach, he concludes that a synthesized model that respects basic human rights
would realize this objective.
37. I have argued elsewhere that the BCGSEU holds significant promise for persons with disabilities,
even though it does not treat disability-based discrimination, because it clarifies the law with respect
to accommodation, and deals with systemic discrimination. See Rose Voyvodic, "BCGSEU v. Brit-
ish Columbia": Rescuing the Idea of Accommodation" [unpublished].
38. A Quicklaw search of the heading Charter in the "Immigration and Refugee" database revealed only
a total of 1027 possibly relevant citations (some of which are counted more than once) in the caselaw
recorded since 1986. On the other hand, a search of Charter in the "Criminal" database (admittedly a
source of far more caselaw) listed 21445 possible citations.
Applying Equality Principles to Medical Inadmissibility in Canadian Immigration Law 125
all of those cases have resisted the application of "foundational human rights instru-
ments and generally held notions of due process"'39 to immigration rules. Second,
while it is true that a body of literature exists on the subject of "historical" discrimi-
nation in Canadian immigration law and policy, scholarly writing has not addressed
either disability-based discrimination 40 or equality rights within this context. 41
This lack of legal discourse might suggest that there are few problems with discrimi-
nation exist in immigration and refugee law. I will argue here that this is not the case;
rather, the exclusivity imbedded in this area of law, together with the deference given
to its decision makers by most courts and tribunals charged with enforcing human-
rights legislation and the Charter, have shielded it from scrutiny. There is a paradox
found in the stark contrast between the protections found elsewhere in the legal system
to guard against the harm of discrimination, on the one hand, and the refusal of that
same system to extend protections against this harm to non-citizens, on the other.4 2 I
will attempt to demonstrate that this ongoing reluctance to allow federal human-rights
legislation and the Charter their intended scope within immigration law arises either from
a judicial unwillingness to consider these norms to be discriminatory because they are
applied to aliens, or a refusal to extend rights, as opposed to privileges, to aliens.43
I would assert, however, that either basis for this reluctance is untenable, in view of
emerging principles of substantive equality that consider, in the words of Madame
Justice McLachlin in the BCGSEU case, "the way institutions and relations must be
39. Virginia Bartley, Book Review of Immigration Law by Donald Galloway" (1998) 24 Queen's L.J.
345 at 349.
40. However, an article by Ian Dowbiggin called "Keeping This Young Country Sane: C.K. Clarke,
Immigration Restriction, and Canadian Psychiatry, 1890-1925" (1995) 76 Can. Historical Rev. 598
brings a historical approach to disability-based discrimination, while Margaret Somerville and Sarah
Wilson engage in a modern analysis of HIV and AIDS-based discrimination in "Crossing Bound-
aries: Travel, Immigration, Human Rights and AIDS" (1998) 43 McGill LJ. at 781.
41. But see, for example, Chantal Tie, "Immigrant Selection and the Canadian Human Rights Act"
(1994) 20 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 81, Phillip L. Bryden, "Fundamental Justice and Family Class Immigra-
tion: The Example of Pangli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)" (1991) 41
U.T.L.J. 484, and Lissett Barsallo, "Visitor Visas: The Stamp of Inequality" (1998) 25 Man. L.J.
483. Donald Galloway has also written about immigration in the context of liberal theory ("Three
Models of (1n)Equality" (1993) 38 McGill L.J. 64; "Liberalism, Globalism and Immigration" (1993)
18 Queen's L.J. 266; and "Strangers and Members: Equality in an Immigration Setting" (1994) 7
Can. J. L. & Jur. 149)) as has William Kymlicka, "Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity"
(1991) 4 Can. J. L. & Jur. 239, and Catherine Dauvergne, "Beyond Justice: The Consequences of
Liberalism for Immigration Law" (1997) 10 Can. J. L. & Juris. 323.
42. Somerville and Wilson, supra note 40, observe that the effect of excluding non-nations because they
have HIV or AIDS "might seem to be a paradox in certain countries-namely the co-existence in
law of anti-discrimination measures for the protection of nationals from discrimination on the basis
of illness (or likewise, on the basis of nationality), and exclusionary entry restrictions for non-nation-
als based on these same grounds" [emphasis added], at page 798. The authors therefore wonder
whether immigration law is therefore "ethical," acknowledging that this question "might seem
unusual to some lawyers."
43. Another view is that judges may refuse to consider these norms to be discriminatory because they
are applied to aliens.
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challenged in order to make them available, accessible, meaningful and rewarding for
the many diverse groups of which our society is composed." 44 It would appear
therefore fallacious to exclude institutions such as Citizenship and Immigration
Canada from this examination simply because they relate to non-citizens, unless there
is a legitimate basis for exempting non-citizens from human-rights protections. I will
therefore turn to citizenship and immigration theory to determine whether such a basis
exists.
1. Citizenship and immigration theory
It has been said that "[tihe alien has traditionally been hors la loi."'45 The principle of
state sovereignty provides nations control over their borders and the right to admit or
exclude non-nationals. In Canada, controls upon the admission of newcomers were
first introduced after Confederation, when immigration policy began to address
problems resulting from an essentially unrestricted program, such as "unhealthy
travelling conditions and unscrupulous profiteers, and the exclusion of individuals
who were physically or mentally unfit or who exhibited other socially undesirable
qualities."46
The trend toward greater selectivity and away from unrestricted encouragement of
English-speaking settlers became a feature of immigration legislation passed in the
early twentieth century, in which "prohibited classes" began to be described, and a
broad and general power of deportation was created. The classes of people who would
be refused entry or removed included persons with disabilities, persons without
sufficient means to support themselves, criminals, political subversives, and other
"undesirable" persons. Regulations were passed to require immigrants to possess a
certain amount of money, depending upon their race, occupation or destination, and
"to prohibit the landing in Canada, of immigrants belonging to any race deemed
unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada, or of immigrants of any specified
class, occupation or character."47
Throughout Canada's history, foreigners have often been made scapegoats in the
attempts by legislators to assuage populist fears. Provinces such as British Columbia
and Saskatchewan attempted to indirectly limit immigration from Asia through the
denial of entry of certain races into certain occupations 48 or the placement of controls
upon settlement. Federal efforts to impede the entry to Canada by Asians included the
44. BGSEU, supra note 9 at para. 41.
45. This means "beyond the scope of the law." See H. Patrick Glenn, Strangers at the Gate: Refugees,
Illegal Entrants and Procedural Justice (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais) at 5.
46. See Christopher J. Wydrzynski, Canadian Immigration Law and Practice (Aurora: Canada Law
Book, 1983) at 39-66, for a full treatment of the history of Canadian immigration law.
47. Ibid. at 46.
48. See, for example, Kwong Wing v. R. (1914), 18 D.L.R. 121, 49 S.C.R. 440, which dealt with
provincial legislation prohibiting "Orientals" from employing white women; and Union Colliery v.
Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580 (P.C.), considering legislation preventing Chinese immigrants from work-
ing in the mining industry.
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notorious "continuous journey" regulations 49 and the Chinese Immigration Act. 50
Growing unease resulting from the Russian Revolution, and domestic uprisings such
as the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 were reflected in legislation that resulted in
the deportation of thousands of trade unionists, suspected subversives, and other
"undesirables."
The Depression of the 1930s and the outbreak of the Second World War led to active
discouragement of immigration; after the war, the acute labour shortage led to a
demand for immigrant workers and an expansion of the categories of admissible
immigrants. However, the focus was placed upon immigrants from Britain, the white
commonwealth, the United States, and France, while immigration from Asia and
Africa would continue to be severely restricted. Prime Minister Mackenzie King
invoked the principle of state sovereignty in defending his government's restrictive
immigration policy in a speech that continues to resound in today's legislation:
[w]ith regard to the selection of immigrants, much has been said about discrimina-
tion. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in
selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a "funda-
mental human right" of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of
domestic policy.5 1
This paradigm principle of Canadian immigration law has been described as "so
powerful that it is often seen to 'trump' not only any human rights claims by
non-citizens but also the human rights-related obligations which are included in s. 3
of the [Immigration] Act."'5 2 It has also allowed policy makers to react more favourably
to public demand for restrictions upon the rights of aliens53 than to any demand for
the extension of rights or protections to this group.54 As Donald Galloway suggests,
49. Immigrants seeking admission to Canada in the early twentieth century were required to have
travelled in one "continuous journey," without interrupting their travel. (This was intended to prevent
immigration from South Asia, since travel from that part of the world could not be completed
"continuously" at that time.) The "climate" regulations were based on the notion that certain races
were unable to adapt to Canada's cold climate, and were therefore spared the discomfort of residing
here.
50. S.C. 1909.
51. House of Commons Debates (1 May 1947) at 2646.
52. Anna Pratt, "Dunking the Doughnut: Discretionary Power, Law and the Administration of the
Canadian lImmigration Act" (1999) 8 Social & Legal Studies 199, at page 207. Section 3(0 of the Act
includes the objective "to ensure that any person who seeks admission to Canada on either a
permanent or temporary basis is subject to standards of admission that do not discriminate in a
manner inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, as
am., s. 3(f).
53. Barsallo writes, "Amidst the powerful press campaign designed to present rich immigrant drug
dealers as the prototype of recent immigrants, not even the deportation of people who have lived in
Canada since their childhood has attracted popular condemnation," supra note 41 at note 97, 504.
54. "The evidence is overwhelming-from Canada's historical discriminatory exclusion of "undesir-
able" racial and ethnic groups, to the detention and deportation of "subversives" and the indigent, to
the more recent deportation of those deemed to represent a danger to the public--that the Canadian
people and its governments have easily and comfortably accepted that the rights of non-citizens can
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immigration law and policy are more likely to define the directions most favourable
to the Canadian economy than to raise issues about any political obligations to
"strangers." 55
Undoubtedly, this principle is also the primary reason that discriminatory immigration
rules or decisions have rarely been subjected to the scrutiny of a rights-based analysis
in Canada, notwithstanding the expansion of international law56 and the introduction
of constitutional equality rights and anti-discrimination legislation in the Bill of Rights,
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA), 57
which purported to widen the scope of entitlements for foreign non-residents. 58
These constitutional and quasi-constitutional guarantees are not easily enforced, given
the reluctance of courts and tribunals to intrude into the territory occupied by immigra-
tion officials: it has been said that "[i]mmigration law, like the law surrounding parole
and prison discipline, has held a reputation among people interested in administrative
law as a sort of wasteland in which judges have been loathe to apply the legal principles
we normally associate with a sense of justice in Canadian public administration." 59
Constitutional guarantees of due process were extended to foreign non-resident
asylum seekers in 1985 in the Singh60 case, resulting in the reform of Canada's refugee
determination system. However, notwithstanding Wilson J.'s prescient warning in that
case, 61 the traditional distinction between "rights" for Canadian citizens and "privi-
leges" for non-citizens continues to inform the jurisprudence. As noted by Galloway,
the caselaw that purports to follow Singh is particularly problematic, because that case
does not "specify whether it is amenability to Canadian law or physical presence in
Canada which is determinative. '62
be abridged with vastly more ease than those of citizens": Pratt, supra note 52 at 206.
55. Galloway, supra note 41, "Strangers and Members" at 154.
56. Glenn, supra note 45 at 6.The extent to which the procedural and substantive rights of aliens have
been advanced by international law is slight, although the European Convention on Human Rights
may hold more promise than international instruments such as the 1949 Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, or the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which provide defini-
tions, but not remedies or procedures by which to evaluate violation of rights.
57. R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.
58. Prior to the domestic enactment of equality rights, challenges to the old provincial statutes that
discriminated against "aliens" were limited to cumbersome constitutional arguments that such legis-
lation was ultra vires the powers given to the provinces by the British North America Act. See, for
example, the cases cited supra at note 48.
59. Phillip L. Bryden, supra note 41 at 484.
60. Re Singh and Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 17 D.L.R. (4th)422.
61. She wrote, "The creation of a dichotomy between privileges and rights played a significant role in
narrowing the scope of the application of the Canadian Bill of Rights... I do not think this kind of
analysis is acceptable in relation to the Charter. It seems to me rather that the recent adoption of the
Charter by Parliament and nine of the ten provinces as part of the Canadian constitutional frame-
work has sent a clear message to the courts that the restrictive attitude which at times characterized
their approach to the Canadian Bill of Rights ought to be re-examined," at 461-62.
62. D. Galloway, "The Extraterritorial Application of the Charter to Visa Applicants" (1991) 23 Ottawa
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Others suggest that a variety of factors, in addition to curial deference, is responsible
for this "wasteland." Bagambiire writes,
The reluctance of the courts to impose stringent constitutional standards in the area,
the preparedness of the courts to quickly defer to the executive arm of government,
the lack of sophistication in Charter issues on the part of most members of the immigra-
tion bar and academy, and the vulnerability and lack of resources on the part of those
who would benefit directly from Charter challenges in the field, have all conspired to
make the Charter a hollow promise in the immigration and refugee area 63
Aliens with disabilities are therefore vulnerable to social constructions: those that
underlie the extension of principles of accommodation to persons with disability
generally, and those that underlie the extension of rights to non-citizens. In each case,
the complex web of bio-medical and socio-economic considerations that operate as
obstacles to substantive equality are evident.
2. Contextualizing discrimination in immigration law and decision-making
Discrimination, in the plain sense of the word, has been said to be integral to the
formulation and operation of immigration policy, which requires distinctions to be
made between persons who apply for entry or admission, for reasons of state security,
as well as administrative considerations.64 The legislation's definitions and categories
create a range of criteria related to a person's status, which are designed to assist
immigration officials in selecting immigrants. The selection process is, generally
speaking, based upon an assessment of status in light of rules of admissibility that are
geared to test for "suitability." However, if the criteria themselves are harmful, in that
they result in exclusion based upon discriminatory norms, or if discretion is exercised
unfairly in the application of the rules, and the result is exclusion, then "discrimination"
in its pejorative sense should be seen to arise, and in turn trigger legal challenges. 6 5
L. Rev. 335, discusses how Wilson, J.'s reference to refugee claimants as being "physically present
in Canada" has been invoked in caselaw, which has limited the application of fundamental justice to
persons applying for immigrant visas: see Ruparel v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
(1990), 17 Imm.L.R. (2d) 190 (F.C.T.D.); the mobility rights section of the Charter has also been
cited as authority for the limitation of rights to non-citizens: see Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711.
63. Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 1996) at 391.
64. Julius H. Grey stated, in his 1984 text, Immigration Law in Canada, "In a sense all of immigration
law is discriminatory... It is therefore, not surprising that neither the statutory Canadian Bill of
Rights of 1960 [footnote omitted] nor the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 [footnote omit-
ted] have had any effect on immigration law." (Toronto: Butterworths) at 152.
65. A 1993 documentary produced by the National Film Board of Canada, entitled Who Gets In?
provides graphic examples of the extent to which "discretion" operates in the assessment of "suitabil-
ity" in its examination of overseas processing in Canadian visa offices in the Philippines, Hong
Kong, and Nigeria. In a powerful scene, Mike Molloy, then consul in Nigeria, candidly discussed his
denial of a landing request made by a former Army officer from Zaire as a refugee, on the grounds of
"personal suitability," which he assessed by imagining how a person "like him" would "fit in" to a
Canadian neighbourhood, for example, next door to his mother. His commentary is heard over the
visual image of this muscular African man dressed in army boots, clearly hopeful and anxious about
his application as he waits in the lobby of the embassy for what the viewer already knows will be a
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The potential for a positive outcome of such challenges in favour of aliens has typically
been tempered, however, by a judicial approach that treats immigration decisions as
virtually unassailable, 66 and resists the application of paramount legislation such as
the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Charter.67
Indeed, in Anvari v. Canada, Mahoney, J., in dismissing allegations of disability-based
discrimination brought against the Minister of Immigration under the Canadian
Human Rights Act, observed, "The Immigration Act is replete with provisions which
not only permit but require that adverse differentiation be made in relation to individ-
uals on grounds of national origin; its provisions also require adverse differentiation-
on grounds of age, marital and family status as well as disability... The Act is about
little else than discriminatory practices .. . "68
This inherently exclusionary legislation has not yet sufficiently offended egalitarian
values to the extent that political pressure has been brought to bear to reform it. On
the contrary, it has been noted that the "general characterization of migrants as abusers
of social welfare systems or as criminals would indicate that migrants are perceived
as morally different."'69 Historically, Canadian residents' negative perception of immi-
grants has found its way into stunning examples of legislated racism and xenophobia. 7
0
The creation of "prohibited classes" of persons considered unacceptable has enabled
successive governments of the day to exclude unwanted aliens,71 which have always
included persons with disabilities. Economic and political pressures have also contributed
to the public demonization of immigrants, as seen in the turn-of-the-century anti-Asian
negative decision, in an effective depiction of how subjective factors (which some may consider
racist) influence discretion.
66. A notable recent example of an exception to this rule may be seen in the contextual approach taken
in the case of Baker v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, in which the
standard of review for discretionary decisions related to landing applications based on humanitarian
and compassionate grounds was re-evaluated by the Supreme Court of Canada. It is also interesting
to note that courts of provincial superior jurisdiction have, on occasion, been much more willing than
judges operating in the federal-level courts to scrutinize immigration legislation for equality and
fairness, when, for example, they have been called upon to exercise their parens patriae jurisdiction
(see Francis v. Minister of Citizenship and Imnigration, [ 1998] O.J. No. 1791 (QL)).
67. In fact, Arthur Weinrib and Rocco Galati complain that the rights of aliens "at common law were
better than they are now under the Charter" in The Criminal Lawyers' Guide to Immigration and
Citizenship Law (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 1996) at 3. The authors further state that the
guiding principles of Singh appear to have been undermined by cases such as Dehghani v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, 18 Imm.LR.(2d) 245, and Chiarelli,
supra note 63.
68. (1993) 19 Imm.L.R. (2d) 192, at 196. As will be discussed, infra, Mahoney, J.'s sanguine assessment
of the discriminatory nature of the Immigration Act in this case is a classic example of the "rights"
vs. "privileges" dichotomy.
69. Somerville and Wilson, supra note 40 at 798.
70. This means, literally, "fear of the stranger."
71. Pratt, supra note 52, notes, "As previously legitimate racist and moralistic grounds for exclusion
were legally and socially delegitimized, concerns about security, criminality and danger, often articu-
lated through the language of risk, emerged almost simultaneously as one of the last remaining
legitimate grounds for exclusion," at 219.
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policies and laws referred to above,72 and in the current characterization of immigrants
in public discourse 73 as criminals (dangers to the public), bogus refugees (queue jumpers,
illegal migrants), and social-assistance recipients (welfare defrauders).7 4
Canada's humanitarian sympathies, and the waxing and waning of the country's need
for workers, have battled with "shifting social anxieties" that are "inflected by
dominant, historically specific discourses" 7 5 to dictate the numbers and the types of
"desirable" immigrants. 76 In addition, the process of selection of these immigrants is
characterized by the exercise of wide discretionary powers within a framework that is
exclusionary in its nature and philosophy. The medical inadmissibility criteria, which tend
to exclude persons with disabilities, form just one part of this exclusionary framework.
i. Medical inadmissibility: Persons with disabilities as a "prohibited class"
It appears that the earliest Canadian legislative attempts to create medically inadmis-
sible classes focussed upon threats posed by "unhealthy" immigrants. Section 11 of
the 1859 Act Respecting Emigrants and Quarantine, in addition to requiring the
quarantining of emigrants suffering from typhoid and smallpox, referred to the
rejection of "lunatic, idiotic, deaf and dumb, blind or infirm person[s]." '77 While
subsequent legislation continued to exclude immigrants suffering from "loathsome"
diseases, such as tuberculosis, 7 8 as well as (up until 1978) "idiots, imbeciles or
morons, '7 9 the 1976 Act modernized medically based restrictions on admission by
ceasing to list specific types of conditions and applying criteria that consider the
"danger to public health and safety" and "excessive demand on health and social
services" that might result from "any disease, disorder or other health impairment."
Currently, all persons seeking entry or admission to Canada as immigrants or visitors
must satisfy the "medical admissibility" and "ability to self-support" criteria of the
72. Infra pages 18-19.
73. Racist Discourse in Canada's English Print Media by Frances Henry and Carol Tator, published by
The Canadian Race Relations Foundation, March 2000, conducts a discourse analysis of the "Just
Desserts Caf" killing, which provided a field day for media on issues of immigration and criminal-
ity. The authors state that this coverage "contributed significantly to changes in the law by tightening
the rules for the deportation of alleged criminals," at 128.
74. See Employment and Immigration Canada, Managing Immigration: A Framework for the 1990s
(Ottawa: Employment and Immigration Canada, 1992), in which migrants are referred to repeatedly
in association with criminal activity and abuse of the welfare system.
75. Pratt, supra note 52 at 218.
76. 'The stalwart peasant in a sheepskin coat with a stout wife and a half dozen children" represents an
early vision of a desirable hard-working (white, able-bodied and principally male) settler, as seen by
Sir Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior, in 1896. Dauvergne, supra note 40, discusses a recent
Canadian government Immigration Plan in the context of "the hegemonic sway of liberal discourse,"
noting that "economic discourse, citizenship discourse and cultural discourse" account for Canadian
immigration policy "since the establishment of the nation," at 325.
77. 22 Vict., c. 40.
78. Section 3(b), Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 93.
79. Section 5, Immigration Act, R.S.C. 2952, c. 325.
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legislation. Visa officers considering applications are required to have regard to
section 19(1) of the Immigration Act, which states,
No person shall be granted admission who is a member of any of the following
classes:
(a) persons who are suffering from any disease, disorder, disability or other
health impairment as a result of the nature, severity or probable duration of
which, in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at least one other
medical officer,
(i) they are or are likely to be a danger to public health or to public safety; or
(ii) their admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause
excessive demands on health or social services;
This legislation, which has been used to deny entry and admission to visitors and
immigrants with disabilities, has been described as "the bane of disability advocates
for many years,"'80 and "an example of discriminatory attitudes reflected in legisla-
tion." 81 I will return to these charges in a critique of the "public danger" and "excessive
demand" criteria from a disability-rights perspective after briefly examining how
findings of medical inadmissibility are made.
In practical terms, in order to find an applicant admissible, the visa officer must be
satisfied about the "reasonableness" of medical examinations that are required of all
immigrants and certain visitors under section 11 of the Act. "Medical officers of
health" apply section 22 of the Regulation to the Immigration Act, and follow a policy
manual prepared by the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, which mandates
consideration of eight factors when forming an opinion on admissibility under this
section.82 Once the medical officer has rendered an opinion, concurred with by one
other medical officer, this opinion is provided to the visa officer. The decision to
approve or deny the application for a visa is provided to the visa applicant, and, in
cases of family-class immigrants, to the sponsor, in writing.
Practical problems of accessibility, significant time delays and cost face immigrants
seeking to challenge a finding of medical inadmissibility through the mechanisms
available for appeals and judicial review of decisions of visa officers.8 3 Appeals, which
80. Sandra A. Goundry, Final Brief on the Proposed Amendments in Bill C-86 to Sections 19(1)(a) and
(b) of the Immigration Act (Winnipeg: The Canadian Disability Rights Council, 1992) [hereinafter
Brief].
81. Supra note 14 at 7.
82. There are five general grounds on which the applicant is assessed: risk to public health, expected
demand on services, response to medical treatment, surveillance, and potential employability or
productivity. Status is based on a total of the scores, ranging from Ml, which identifies no health
impairment, M2 and M3, where the condition is insufficient in itself to render the applicant inadmis-
sible, but may, when considered in combination with other factors, M4 and M5, where present
inadmissibility is subject to future review, and M6 and M7, where the condition is identified as
precluding admission at present and in the foreseeable future.
83. The location of both the IRB (AD) and the Federal Court registries and courts is also problematic for
many residents of Canada who do not live in major centres. Currently, in Ontario, the IRB (AD) sits
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are taken before an administrative tribunal as opposed to a Federal Court judge, are a
more accessible and "user-friendly" form of review, but are available only in limited
circumstances. 84 If the person considered to be medically inadmissible sought entry
as a visitor or as an immigrant85 at a visa office abroad, there is no right of appeal to
a panel of the Immigration Appeal Division. Rather, judicial review of the visa
officer's decision must be sought in the Federal Court (Trial Division) pursuant to the
provisions of the Federal Court Act.86
This is a more costly proposition, as legal representation is most likely required, because
the rules are complex and the objection must be founded in an error of law in order for it
to succeed. For example, neither a court nor a panel of the Appeal Division reviewing a
finding of medical inadmissibility has jurisdiction to question the correctness of the
finding, since the forming of a medical opinion is the prerogative of the medical officer. 87
Section 22 of the regulation, which contains criteria to be considered in forming a
determination of inadmissibility, has been criticized for failing to offer definitions for
critically important terms such as danger to public health or safety, excessive demand,
social services, or "any of the other phrases used in s. 19(l)(a)." 88 In the Ismaili case,
the Regulation was also held to be partially ultra vires the regulation-making power
conferred upon the Governor in Council by Parliament, to the extent that it prescribes
factors related to the determination by medical officers of "whether the admission of
any person would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause demands on health
or social services. '89
only in Toronto, and the Federal Court is accessible only in Toronto and Ottawa. There is, of course,
the additional hurdle of the holding in Ruparel supra note 62, that Charter protections are not
available to persons "not physically present in Canada."
84. When the person considered medically inadmissible is being sponsored by a Canadian citizen or
permanent resident, the sponsor has the right to challenge that finding by filing an appeal with the
Immigration Appeal Division. This appeal may be based upon an error of law, or upon "equitable
grounds" (where there are compelling humanitarian or compassionate considerations for overturning
the finding).
85. The term immigrant is a term of art, describing a person who "seeks landing." Landing, in turn, is
defined as "lawful permission to establish permanent residence in Canada": Immigration Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. 1-2, s. 2.
86. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
87. However, this opinion may be reviewed collaterally. In the words of Cullen, J., in the Ismaili case, a
reviewer "is not competent to make findings of fact related to medical diagnosis, but is competent to
review evidence to determine whether the medical officers' decision is reasonable. Grounds for
unreasonableness of a decision include incoherence or inconsistency, absence of supporting evi-
dence, or failure to consider cogent evidence," Ismaili v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
(1995), 29 Imm.L.R. (2d)l, 100 F.T.R.139 (T.D.) [hereinafter Ismaili] at para. 27.
88. Davies B.N. Bagambiire, Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book,
1996) at 89. For example, the case of Ng v. Canada (1986), 1 Imm.L.R. (2d) 307 sought to judicially
define the term excessive as being "something out of the ordinary; a superabundant demand or
demand of any extreme degree," at 313.
89. The section of the legislation, which contains the regulation-making power, was amended, and
language relating to demand for services was omitted from the amendment. The Court held that this
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In addition to these difficulties created by the legislation, there is another problem in
the claim that "the nature of the cases support the claims . . . that persons with
disabilities are being denied admission into Canada on the basis of discriminatory
assumptions and practices." 90
ii. Critiquing the criteria from the perspective of disability rights
It has been argued by disability-rights advocates that medical officers do not pay
adequate attention to the factors set forth in the regulations and instead concentrate
on the diagnosis itself. Even if they do apply the other factors, it is said that they are
not appropriately trained or situated to determine the potential of a person with a
disability to participate in society, and often "ascribe to many of the myths about
persons with disabilities which are prevalent in society and which are rooted in a
medical orientation." 91 Furthermore, medical officers based overseas may reflect
cultural attitudes towards persons with disabilities that are even more antiquated than
those prevalent in modem-day Canada. 92
Protection of the public purse has also led to restrictions placed upon entry of those
considered likely to be a burden on society through "excessive demand of health and
social services." The ability to secure permanent employment sufficient to sustain
oneself and one's dependants also guides discretionary decisions on "settlement
capability" of sponsored immigrants and others seeking permanent residence on
"humanitarian and compassionate grounds." However, one need only reflect on the
description of Canadian citizens with disabilities as "largely supplicant, substantially
under-represented in the workforce, frequently marginalized and isolated and signif-
icantly poorer than other Canadians"' 93 in order to appreciate that a person with
disabilities seeking immigration status will be facing employment-related barriers that
are even higher than those faced by other immigrants, which are already considerable.
It has been noted that "even a cursory examination of the section 19(1)(a) jurispru-
dence reveals that the medical inadmissibility sections of the Act are problematic from
the perspective of persons with disabilities. '94 While many decisions made under this
regulation have been judicially reviewed, and findings of medical inadmissibility have
been attacked on grounds of procedural fairness, or improper exercise of discretion, 95
portion of the regulation therefore had no legal foundation and could not stand.
90. Brief supra note 81 at 10: "This is particularly true of cases in which the refusal is based on a
medical diagnosis of Down Syndrome or 'mental retardation' and the virtually automatic finding of
'excessive demands'-which make up an alarming proportion of medical inadmissibility cases."
91. Ibid. at 21.
92. Ibid. at 28: "In other cultures and countries, attitudes toward persons with disabilities may not be
consistent with the equality perspective which Canada promotes."
93. McKenna, supra note 23 at 158. See also G. Annable, Perspectives on the Journey: The Qualifica-
tions and Experience of Canadian Job Seekers with Disabilities (Winnipeg: The Canadian Council
on Rehabilitation and Work, 1993), and the Statistics Canada Health and Limitation Survey, 1986
and 1987.
94. Brief supra note 80 at 10.
95. The chain of cases reported tends to suggest that visa officers have no discretion to review the
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the legislation itself has not been successfully challenged on questions of fundamental
justice or equality rights.
Several attempts have been made to challenge the legislation itself on Charter grounds
at the level of the Immigration Appeal Division, attacking the constitutional vagueness
of the "excessive demand" criterion of the medical inadmissibility rules. In the Grewal
case,96 Canadian-citizen sponsors of immigrants who appealed the denial of perma-
nent resident status to a non-resident relative who was found to be likely to place
excessive demands upon Canadian health and social services alleged that their section
7 Charter rights were infringed upon because the concept under consideration was too
vague, making it impossible for them to know the case they had to meet. Previous
cases, such as Ismaili and Jim, 97 were considered to have created tests on what
constitutes excessive demands, including "more than what is normal" demands on
health and social services. It was found in Grewal that what constitutes "normal" is
not a matter for legal debate, but rather a policy matter, which ought to be defined
through government policy. 98
Even though the constitutional rights alleged to be infringed upon were located in
citizens, not aliens, in that case, the tribunal refused to extend Charter protection,
reasoning that, while "the concept of 'excessive demand' is general and lacks precision
... it falls short of being vague," and "benefits an appellant who can then argue the
specific circumstances to be considered in his or her particular case, more than would
a fixed definition of what would in all cases be considered excessive. ' 99
No cases have thus far successfully challenged the creation of prohibited classes on
the grounds that they infringe upon section 15 rights, 10 0 or, in which the medical-inad-
medical officers' conclusion, but may decide whether an applicant will be a burden on health and
social services, although this cannot be said to be a principle that has been consistently applied. See,
for example, Ismaili, supra note 89, Poste v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [1997] F.C.J.
No. 1805, Imm.-4601-96, 22 December 1997, and Wong v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,
(1998) 34 Imm. L.R. (2d) 18 (F.C.T.D), which tend to hold that the visa officer must not merely rely
on the opinion of the medical officers, but must also decide whether a person will be a burden on
health services and social services, where the medical officers' conclusion is unreasonable. Bagambiire
notes, however, that succeeding in this manner may in fact be an "empty victory" if the subsequent
medical opinion ordered also results in a finding of inadmissibility on new medical grounds.
96. Grewal v. Canada (Minister of Citijenship and Immigration) [1997] I.A.D.D. No. 1181, No. V95-
01266.
97. Jim v. Canada (Solicitor General), (1993), 22 Imm.L.R. (2d) 261 (F.C.T.D.).
98. Ibid. at para. 31. The hypothetical question posed was, "If an individual is an elderly male, is the
normal group he is to be compared to in order to determine whether his admission would cause
excessive demands on health and social services, all Canadians, Canadian males, all Canadian males
within his age group, or all Canadian males within his age group suffering from the same condition?"
99. Grewal, supra note 96 at para. 42.
100. Examples of cases in which section 15 is raised are Orantes v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), (1990), 34 F.T.R. 184 (T.D.), in which the applicants unsuccessfully argued that
women as a group were disadvantaged by the operation of the "inability to support" criteria, and
Nueda v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993] F.C.J. No. 577 DRS 94-03195,
Action 92-T-1401, in which it was unsuccessfully argued that foreign domestic workers form a
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missibility criteria specifically are alleged to violate the equality rights provisions of
the Charter.101 Moreover, it has been noted that a meritorious challenge usually results
in the award of a "minister's permit"'102 (as opposed to permanent resident status).' 03
This has been described as part of a "government strategy to 'challenge-proof' an
unconstitutional law.'104
When cases have been fully litigated and subsequently reported, it is clear that courts
considering claims of discrimination in relation to these criteria have failed to apply
a rights-based analysis to medical inadmissibility. This may be illustrated by the
approach seen to be taken by the Federal Court of Appeal in the case of Canada (A.G.).
v. Anvari.1 05 In that case, the Court held that a tribunal appointed under the Canadian
group that is discriminated against. Section 7 and section 12 have also been argued unsuccessfully in
cases where criminality has excluded aliens and even permanent residents.
101. In Bui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] I.A.D.D. No. 24, No. V96-
00598, other grounds (reasonableness) were used to overturn the decision to deny admission of a
person with disabilities, and therefore it was considered unnecessary by the tribunal to consider the
Charter challenge. Similarly, in Sidhu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1997]
I.A.D.D. No. 1064, No. W95-00018, counsel was said to have failed to satisfy the panel that "the
Charter is applicable to the instant case, as at issue is the medical status and potential admissibility
of a non-Canadian living outside Canada." In Deol v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion) [2000] I.A.D.D. No. 214, there was also said to be "insufficient evidence to place the Principal
Applicant within the definition of 'disability' contemplated by the Charter." The Federal Court of
Appeal, in Thangarajan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 4 F.C. 167,
refused to construe section 19(1)(a) narrowly in considering whether "social services" included
"special education," because it was "not prepared to assume that paragraph 19(1)(1) would offend
section 15 of the Charte ... [iun the absence of a proper debate with respect to section 15 and a
section 1 analysis," para.19. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was subsequently
denied [[2000] S.C.C.A. No. 38).
102. Minister's permits are issued in exceptional cases at the discretion of a delegate of the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, where a person is "otherwise inadmissible." This exceptional nature is
also problematic. As stated by the Canadian Disability Rights Council, "[The current use of Minister's
Permits, used in this way, reinforces the idea that persons with disabilities are exceptions - requiring
'special' not equal treatment." Brief supra note 80 at 22. Minister's Permits provide few of the
"privileges" of permanent resident status--they are issued for temporary periods, and therefore
discourage feelings of "belonging." A few of the "perquisites" that go along with permanent resident
status, but are forbidden to permit holders and therefore exacerbate these feelings are social insur-
ance numbers that do not begin with the numeral 9 and therefore identify their bearers as "non-resi-
dent," entitlement to student loans and "regular" tuition, and the ability to obtain a travel document.
103. "The question which arises is, how many times a Minister's permit has been issued on the eve of the
filing of a lawsuit against the government." Ibid. at 22.
104. Ibid at 22.
105. Canada (A.G.) v. Anvari (1993), 19 Imm.L.R. (2d) 192 (Fed. A.A.) reversing (1991), 14 C.H.R.R.
D/292 (Cdn. Human Rights Review Trib.). Mehran Anvari applied for landing under a special
program created in the 1980s to facilitate admission of Iranian nationals applying for permanent
residence from within Canada. He was approved in principle, but later denied landing, following the
finding by medical officers that he would require medical treatment to assist him as a result of the
lingering effects of childhood polio. He filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commis-
sion, alleging discrimination arising from his disability. The Human Rights Tribunal found that the
evidence of the medical officers on the "excessiveness" of the costs of corrective surgery was
speculative, and in conflict with evidence led by Anvari's medical experts which suggested that the
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Human Rights Act did not have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint of discrimination
under that legislation, based on the allegation that a medical opinion formed within
the context of the Immigration Act was unreasonable. Even if the tribunal did have
jurisdiction, the Court concluded that "subpara. 19(l)(a)(ii) mandates an otherwise
discriminatory practice which is bona fide justified."' 0 6 The Court analogized the
language of the medical-inadmissibility criteria ("would cause or might reasonably be
expected to cause excessive demands on health or social services") to the Canadian
Human Rights Act's requirement of bona fide justification.10 7
From the perspective of disability-rights theory, this reasoning is clearly flawed. It
appears to accept as a given that the "excessive demand" criterion is a justification in
and of itself for prohibiting admission, without questioning the precepts upon which
it is based (what is "normal" as compared to "excessive"?). 10 8 It also ignores the
possibility that the criterion itself represents a discriminatory norm that may be
directly traced to the economic and biomedical models of disablement. It also inher-
ently incorporates outdated, discriminatory concepts in failing to create a context in
which all of the factors set out in section 22 of the regulations (including socio-eco-
nomic factors) could be taken into account.10 9
Were this case to be litigated today, legal argumentation reflecting theoretical critiques
of the traditional models of disablement, and the judicial reasoning found in recent
decisions such as BCGSEU, could be made to urge a different result, which would
integrate the concept of reasonable accommodation into the "justification" process,
and challenge the exclusionary nature of these criteria on principles of substantive
equality. 110
cost would not be "excessive," and ordered that he be landed and be compensated for medical
expenses and injury to his feelings and self-respect. The respondent Minister of Employment and
Immigration appealed to the Review Tribunal, which modified the compensation award, but con-
curred in the finding of discrimination. That ruling was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal.
106. Ibid at 198.
107. Section 15(g) of the CHRA exempts otherwise discriminatory practices if "there is a bona fide
justification for that denial or differentiation."
108. In Grewal, for example, the Immigration Appeal Board panel member states, 'There is no end to the
debate in Canada concerning the extent to which resources available for health and social services
are strained. For Parliament, and those wishing to see a continuation of the existence of a social
safety net, seeking to ensure that these resources are not unreasonably strained to a greater extent is a
valid social objective," supra note 97 at para. 43.
109. The Canadian Disability Rights Council also has raised serious questions about the appropriateness
of the chief decision maker being medical practitioners, in view of the inherent problems with the
skewed way in which disability is perceived in the "biomedical model" and the attendant difficulties
with integrating the concept of accommodation. See Brief, supra note 80 at 36.
110. It is troublesome to note the Federal Court of Appeal's refusal to consider constitutional argumenta-
tion in Thangarajan (supra note 101) on the grounds that it was too "general." However, this
suggests the need for extensive and thorough groundwork to be laid through expert evidence, which
supports a finding of discrimination and enables a section I analysis to be withstood.
(2001) 16 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Criticisms of the legislation's failure to avoid unfair reliance on discriminatory norms
based upon disability-rights theory have formed part of lobbying strategies, particu-
larly by the Canadian Disability Rights Council, which are designed to be incorporated
into amendments to the immigration legislation. In a brief submitted in 1992, a serious
attack was made upon the inequality fostered by the medical-inadmissibility criteria.
To illustrate the subtle invidiousness of these criteria, the Council identified certain
myths that they reflect.
These myths are described as perpetuating "five of the most insidious and prevalent
discriminatory attitudes and beliefs about persons with disabilities which continue to
inform public policy on immigration."Il Rooted within the economic and biomedical
models of disability, the myths underlie the discriminatory norms reflected in inflex-
ible, discriminatory rules, which result in the denial of entry and admission to Canada
to persons with disabilities, stereotyping persons with disabilities into one or more of
the following categories: "chronically ill individuals," "a drain on the health care
system," "an excessive burden on society," "unemployable and can never contribute
to society," and/or in the case of immigrants and visitors with HIV/AIDS, "a danger
to public health and safety and their admission would cause excessive demands on
medical services."1 12
The brief setting out these myths, as well as an item-by-item critique of the criteria,
which strongly criticized their lack of flexibility, and therefore human-rights and
equality-rights protections, was submitted to the legislative committee reviewing Bill
C-86, an Act to Amend the Immigration Act, in 1992. This was not the first (or last)
time the federal government was exhorted to amend this legislation in order to respect
the constitutional standard of equality enshrined in section 15 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. In 1985, the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights
released a report entitled Equality for All, following an audit of all federal laws for
compliance with section 15. In that report, it was recommended that "medical stan-
dards for admission to Canada be made public and reviewed and modified in order
that they be more flexible in their application."'"13
In its response, the government accepted the recommendation that section 3(f) of the
Immigration Act be amended to state, as an objective of Canadian immigration policy,
that such policy should ensure that the Act, the Immigration Regulations and.Immigra-
tion guidelines contain standards of admission that do not discriminate in a manner
prohibited by the Charter. However, it refused to amend the "medical standards for
admission," and took the position that its regime was flexible enough to adapt to
changing conditions. 114
111. Ibid. at 16.
112. Ibid. at 16-20.
113. (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985).
114. Toward Equality: The Response to the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights (Ottawa: Supply
and Services Canada, 1986).
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In 1991, the Immigration Act was identified by disability-rights activists as a statute
based on "outmoded and stereotypical assumptions and beliefs about persons with
disabilities," which required amendment "to begin the process of legislative reform
prerequisite to the realization of full social, economic, and political integration of
persons with disabilities." 115
Bill C-86 purported to amend the legislation by removing express references to
"disability":
(a) persons who, in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at least one
other medical officer, are persons
(i) who, for medical reasons, are or are likely to be a danger to public
health or to public safety, or
(ii) whose admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to
cause excessive demands, within the meaning assigned to that expres-
sion by the regulations, on health or prescribed social services.
Disability-rights advocates responded to the proposed amendment by arguing that this
simply removed evidence of direct discrimination, while maintaining tests that focus
upon the disability, and not the "person as a whole." 116 It was also argued that, by
continuing to give medical officers the power to determine admissibility, when the
medical profession has failed to move beyond the model of thought that disability.
represents impairment or illness, the legislation continues to discriminate against
persons with disabilities. Invoking criticisms of the "biomedical model of disable-
ment," the Canadian Disability Rights Council has stated that "physicians are notori-
ously ill-equipped to assess the abilities and evaluate the potential contributions of an
applicant with a disability--their nature and orientation of their education and training
almost preclude such an expertise." 117 Furthermore, the test of "excessive demand"
is used, without defining it or using data on the rate of use of health and social services
by immigrants generally, as compared to the Canadian population.
In 1998, the government-appointed Legislative Review Advisory Group (LRAG)
tabled a white paper entitled "Not Just Numbers." 118 This report, which was aimed at
overhauling decision-making in immigration law, proposed the creation of a federal-
provincial council, to "provide a forum for more structured consultation and policy
development on issues of mutual interest." 119 It also made a series of recommendations
in a framework for future immigration, including the following:
The Immigration and Citizenship Act should maintain the distinction between per-
sons who are inadmissible for reasons of danger to public health and safety and
those who are inadmissible on account of excessive costs to the health-care system.
115. Ibid at 1.
116. Brief, supra note 80 at 24.
117. Ibid at 25.
118. Legislative Review Advisory Group, Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future
Immigration (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997).
119. Ibid., Recommendation 22.
140 (2001) 16 Journal of Law and Social Policy
The term "excessive costs" should be defined by the Federal-Provincial Council on
Immigration and Protection and described in the Regulations in such a way that it is
transparent and objective.
It also recommended that the federal-provincial council establish criteria for the
admission of "otherwise medically inadmissible persons," and that the legislation
grant only provisional status to "persons subject to medical surveillance," and that
renewal of their documents or approval of their citizenship applications be made
contingent upon the demonstration of "an acceptable contact address in Canada, ' 120
and "ongoing contact with provincial authorities." 12'
While the LRAG recommendations called for training of medical officers, this training
was directed at the collection of "information on emerging and ongoing international
health risks," not the appropriate assessment of work-related capacities or need for
treatment or intervention, once again ignoring the recommendations of the Canadian
Disability Rights Council.
Indeed, it appears that these recommendations continue to be ignored. In the fall of
2000, Bill C-3 1, "An Act respecting immigration to Canada and the granting of refugee
protection to persons who are displaced, persecuted, or in danger," was introduced by
the government. This Bill "died on the order paper" when Parliament was dissolved
upon the calling of a federal election, and was replaced by an identical Bill C-11. This
Bill clearly focuses upon other aspects of inadmissibility, particularly criminality, and
again ignores the problems inherent, from an equality perspective, in medical admis-
sibility.122 It creates "health grounds," which cause the inadmissibility of a "foreign
national, other than a permanent resident.., if their health condition (a) is likely to
be a danger to public health; (b) is likely to be a danger to public safety; or (c) might
reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services. '123
Again, there is no articulation of the standards that are set with respect to medical
inadmissibility, or of the meaning of excessive demand. In other words, nothing has
changed since the 1992 statement by the Canadian Disability Rights Council that the
medical inadmissibility section of the legislation "has been identified by disability
rights organizations as discriminatory both before and after the enactment of Bill
C-86."124
The use of the difference of disability as a justification for exclusion continues,
therefore, to be endorsed, if not required, by the criteria found in the Immigration Act
and regulations. Elsewhere in Canadian law, a very different approach is beginning to
120. Ibid., Recommendation 132.
121. Ibid., Recommendation 133.
122. This Bill passed second reading and was referred to committee February 27, 2001. At the time of
writing this article, it was in the committee stage.
123. Bill C-11, "An Act respecting immigration to Canada and the granting of refugee protection to
persons who are displaced, persecuted, or in danger," 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2000.
124. Supra note 14, p. 7, n. 16.
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be applied in discrimination cases decided under human rights codes 126 and the
Charter. 127 These cases, dealing with diverse issues affecting the lives of persons with
disabilities, have engendered a growing respect for the differences of disability, and
a rejection of the use of difference as a justification for exclusion.
It is contended that, just as norms underlying rules that exclude persons with disabil-
ities from other areas of society have been held to be discriminatory, so should
discriminatory immigration rules, which may exclude persons with disabilities from
Canadian society itself, be rejected in favour of a more accommodating standard.
II. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A RIGHTS-BASED ANALYSIS
The shift in analysis to the harmful effects of social structures and institutions on
persons with disabilities and away from disabilities in the "socio-political" model of
disability theory was fostered by the introduction of modem human-rights legislation
and the enshrinement of equality rights in the Canadian Constitution. Caselaw inter-
preting these fundamental principles has eschewed outdated formal equality models
in favour of a contextual approach that takes into account the effects of discrimination.
Decisions that deny admission and entry to Canada to persons with disabilities should
therefore be examined within the legal framework of the Charter and the Canadian
Human Rights Act. The first, and not insignificant, hurdle that must be overcome is
the presumption that only privileges, and not rights, should obtain to foreign non-
residents.
This will require a significant "paradigm shift" in the way immigration law and policy
are viewed by legislators and decision makers, similar to that inspired by the Singh
case in 1987. Then, Canada's humanitarian policies, enshrined in its constitutional and
international commitments, required the amendment of legislation to bestow aliens
(refugee claimants) with certain rights related to the processing of their claims. It is
submitted that similar concerns should militate in favour of extending considerations
of due process and equality to persons with disabilities who seek entry and admission
to Canada.
Additional support for such a shift in perspective may also be found in related caselaw.
While cases dealing with persons found to be inadmissible due to criminality have
refused to extend section 7 rights to the process surrounding deportation, 128 it is
submitted that these cases must be re-examined in light of the recent Supreme Court
126. For example, the Huck case (Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Odeon Thea-
tres Ltd. (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 93 (Sask. C.A.)).
127. For example, R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, and Eldridge, supra note 9.
128. For example, Chiarelli, supra note 62. While quite different from disability in many respects, the
notion of criminality is as deeply entrenched in immigration law as is medical inadmissibility. Both
rest upon the rationale of "protection of the health, safety and good order of Canadian society."
Others have attacked the widespread deprivation of rights resulting from the high degree of power
granted to immigration decision makers to deal with aliens and permanent residents who are con-
victed of crimes. See, for example, Pratt, supra note 52.
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of Canada decision in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services)
v. G. (J.)[J.G.,129 which extended the scope of section 7 rights. That case considered
a mother's eligibility for legal aid in child-protection proceedings in which custody
of her children was at risk. The Court found, in the particular circumstances of that
case, that the failure of the state to provide counsel put her at risk of being deprived
of her security of the person in a manner that did not accord with the "principles of
fundamental justice."
Canadian immigration law and policy appear to be fraught with dichotomous objec-
tives (for example, the protection of health, safety, and good order of Canadian society,
on the one hand, and ensuring that its standards of admission do not discriminate, on
the other). However, it is possible to balance these seemingly incompatible goals, since
the creation of flexible, respectful policies treating the admission of immigrants and
visitors is consistent with protecting society. As noted by L'Heureux-Dube, J., in the
recent decision in Baker,
The context here is one where immigration officers must regularly make decisions
that have great importance to the individuals affected by them, but are also often
critical to the interests of Canada as a country. They are individualized, rather than
decisions of a general nature. They also require special sensitivity. Canada is a
nation made up largely of people whose families migrated here in recent centuries.
Our history is one that shows the importance of immigration, and our society shows
the benefits of having a diversity of people whose origins are in a multitude of
places around the world. Because they necessarily relate to people of diverse back-
grounds, from different cultures, races, and continents, immigration decisions demand
sensitivity and understanding by those making them. They require a recognition of
diversity, an understanding of others, and an openness to difference. 130
This judgment, which reviewed the exercise of discretion in applying the "humanitar-
ian and compassionate" inland processing policy, balances the import of decisions
made "to the interests of Canada as a country" against their import to the individuals
affected, and explicitly requires "an openness to difference." In this decision, the
values expressed in the legislation and in international instruments were examined and
held to be integral to the approach taken in decision-making.
This decision is important for many reasons; for the purposes of this paper, its
contextual approach and its refusal to regard immigration law and policy as a
forbidding "wasteland," remote from principles of fundamental justice, are welcome
additions to the discourse relating to disability rights in immigration law and policy.
It is submitted that the use of medical-inadmissibility criteria, which are predicated
upon discriminatory norms, offend the "principles of fundamental justice" by depriv-
ing persons with disabilities access to a respectful and fair determination of their
applications for entry and admission.
129. [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, September 10, 1999.
130. Supra note 67 at para. 47.
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In this analysis, a newly defined notion of excessive demands, which would include
reasonable criteria supported by scientific data and applied through the use of fair and
flexible guidelines, would stem concerns that providing persons with disabilities with
a fair process would open the "floodgates" (in this case, the borders), creating an
explosion in the public cost of health services and social services.
Once it has been demonstrated that fundamental justice should obtain to applicants
for admission to Canada with disabilities, then both the CHRA' 31 and the Charter may
be employed to identify and eliminate the use of outdated models of disablement,
which lead to disability-based discrimination in the context of an application for entry
or admission to Canada.
Critics of the economic and biomedical models of disablement have demonstrated the
harmful effects of policies informed by unfounded assumptions about people with
disabilities, which include systemic discrimination. A heightened awareness of the
social construction of disability is now reflected in the demands of modern anti-dis-
crimination and equality law, which seeks to respect the rights of all persons. Courts
have been entrusted 132 with the power to enforce foundational human-rights instru-
ments, which in turn have the power to transform society in ways that afford protection
and rights of participation to all of its members.
Disability-rights theory now provides the legal foundation to correct years of systemic
discrimination against foreign non-residents seeking entry to Canada. Unfounded and
discriminatory assumptions that people with disabilities will never be productive
citizens, are chronic drains on the health-care system, and inevitably place an exces-
sive burden on society cannot continue to operate to keep out valuable contributors to
Canadian society and their family members. The medical-inadmissibility criteria are
rigid, blunt instruments that unfairly exclude persons with disabilities by discouraging
the consideration of immigrants as whole persons, and leaving them in the "wasteland"
of unexamined injustices.
131. Caselaw has settled the issue of whether an applicant from outside of Canada may seek to have a
complaint investigated under the CHRA. See Canada (Secretary of State for External Affairs) v.
Menghani, [1994] 2 F.C. 102 (T.D.); Singh (Re) [1989] 1 F.C. 430; (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 673; 10
C.H.R.R.D/5501; 86 N.R. 69. Previous cases dealing with medical inadmissibility, such as Anvari,
should be distinguishable in light of subsequent caselaw, such as BCGSEU, which has outlawed
exclusionary rules, which fail to take account of the effect of such rules upon disadvantaged groups.
132. See early Charter cases in which the Supreme Court of Canada articulated principles of interpreta-
tion, such as Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 ("each Charter right must be given a large
and liberal interpretation which best promotes its purposes," 156-57), Andrews (at 175, 182-93), and
R. v. Turpin [1989], 1 S.C.R. 1296 (at 1221-31) in which section 15 was recognized as the culmina-
tion of Canada's expanding human-rights responsibilities.

